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The Preference Cascade - frode - 09-05-2007 03:58 PM
Link...fascinating stuff
Excerpt...read the whole thing, it's relatively short.
********
Three years ago, I looked at the phenomenon of "preference cascades" -- in which people who have been obliged to conceal their true beliefs by social pressure or sheer force suddenly discover that a lot of other people feel the same way -- and wrote:
"This illustrates, in a mild way, the reason why totalitarian regimes collapse
so suddenly. (Click here for a more complex analysis of this and related
issues). Such regimes have little legitimacy, but they spend a lot of effort
making sure that citizens don't realize the extent to which their
fellow-citizens dislike the regime. If the secret police and the censors
are doing their job, 99% of the populace can hate the regime and be ready
to revolt against it - but no revolt will occur because no one realizes
that everyone else feels the same way.
"This works until something breaks the spell, and the discontented realize that
their feelings are widely shared, at which point the collapse of the regime may
seem very sudden to outside observers - or even to the citizens themselves.
Claims after the fact that many people who seemed like loyal apparatchiks
really loathed the regime are often self-serving, of course. But they're also
often true: Even if one loathes the regime, few people have the force of
will to stage one-man revolutions, and when preferences are sufficiently
falsified, each dissident may feel that he or she is the only one, or at least
part of a minority too small to make any difference.
"One interesting question is whether a lot of the hardline Arab states are
like this. Places like Iraq, Syria, or Saudi Arabia spend a lot of time telling their
citizens that everyone feels a particular way, and punishing those who dare
to differ, which has the effect of encouraging people to falsify their
preferences. But who knows? Given the right trigger, those brittle authoritarian
regimes might collapse overnight, with most of the population swearing -
with all apparent sincerity - that it had never supported them, or their
anti-Western policies, at all.
"Perhaps we should think about how to make it so."
Apparently, some people in the White House and the Pentagon did think about that, and the wave of interest in democracy that has swept the Middle East has been impressive. As the New York Times noted this past weekend, the success of elections in Afghanistan and Iraq has led to moves toward democracy around the region:
"The entire Middle East seems to be entering uncharted political and social
territory with a similar mixture of anticipation and dread. Events in Lebanon
and Egypt, following a limited vote for municipal councils in Saudi Arabia and
landmark elections in Iraq, as well as the Palestinian territories, combined
to give the sense, however tentative, that twilight might be descending
on authoritarian Arab governments.
"A mix of outside pressure and internal shifts has created this moment.
Arabs of a younger, more savvy generation appear more willing to take their
dissatisfaction directly to the front stoop of repressive leaders."
Although some people are openly gloating already, I think it's a bit early: Democratization is a process, not an event, and in the Middle East it's a process that's just getting underway, with plenty of room for things to go wrong. And well over a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the democratization process in Eastern Europe is far from finished. Still, it's become clear that those who were claiming -- as recently as a couple of months ago, in some cases -- that Arabs just don't care about democracy, or freedom, were wrong. And though there's a lot of ground to cover between demonstrating that desire, and fulfilling it, it's still an important point.
Recent events also offer us some lessons in how we might continue the process. One lesson is that we need to keep communications as free as possible, worldwide. As the Times article notes:
"Young protesters have been spurred by the rise of new technology,
especially uncensored satellite television, which prevents Arab governments
from hiding what is happening on their own streets. The Internet and
cellphones have also been deployed to erode censorship and help activists
mobilize in ways previous generations never could."
RE: The Preference Cascade - sunnyheel - 09-05-2007 04:33 PM
There are several problems here.
First, freedom and democracy, we have learned to our chagrin, are not necessarily coextensive. A "democratic" Iraq is quite likely to continue to elect theocrats and dictators governing, like the rest of the region, under some quite un-free variation of Islamic law.
Moreover, a democratic Middle East will be more virulently anti-American, at least for the foreseeable future, pretty much across the board (Iran and Syria may be the exceptions).
The grave mistake is trying to place the largely fundamentalist population of the Middle East in a Western frame.
RE: The Preference Cascade - frode - 09-06-2007 08:22 AM
sunnyheel Wrote:There are several problems here.Where is your evidence that Iraqis are "likely" to elect theocrats and dictators? Also, I think you're cramming the ME into one giant anti-American place, and it's far from it. Even less so if it were democratic.
First, freedom and democracy, we have learned to our chagrin, are not necessarily coextensive. A "democratic" Iraq is quite likely to continue to elect theocrats and dictators governing, like the rest of the region, under some quite un-free variation of Islamic law.
Moreover, a democratic Middle East will be more virulently anti-American, at least for the foreseeable future, pretty much across the board (Iran and Syria may be the exceptions).
The grave mistake is trying to place the largely fundamentalist population of the Middle East in a Western frame.
I'd say that dictators, fascists and theocrats are far more likely to persuade their people to be anti-American than a democratic government would. For one thing, dictators et al. control media, control culture, and through these, they control society. When people are given freedom of thought and expression, I think you'll find that they're a lot less likely to hate much of anything.
The article was simply a glance at what catalyzes public sentiment against a repressive regime.
Philosophically, I think Iraq was different than Iran in that Saddam massacred people, whereas Iran does strategic roundups and executions of dissidents. There's a big difference between genocide and persecution. Saddam was ham-fisted in his rule; the Iranians are a lot more calculating.
Therefore, I would prefer the Iranian people to rise up on their own, but I think the underlying point of the article is that usually, some sort of catalyst is required. Sometimes, that catalyst can come from simple economic despair...that's how our Revolution started. But what we had going for us back then is that the British were truly ignorant of how furious we were, until it was too late. General Gage wrote about this. So, we were able to sneak up on British rule, and because their main body was an ocean away, we managed to barely eek out a victory.
Nowadays it's different...worldwide media and internet, immediate projectable power, etc. I have never advocated an invasion of Iran, and I've always stated that it has never been an option for us from a military standpoint...even if we hadn't gone into Iraq. The geography is much more forbidding than Iraq, which can be invaded from many directions at once.
However, massive airstrikes against not only nuke facilities but also against Revolutionary Guard positions and regime locations, can be that catalyst. But, it can only be a catalyst if there is a willing and able population.